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Abstract
For more than 40 years, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD countries and the
International Atomic Energy Administration of the United Nations have published a biannual
document with the title “Uranium Resources, Production and Demand”. This book, known as
the “Red Book”, summarizes data about the actual and near future nuclear energy situation
and presents the accumulated worldwide knowledge about the existing and expected uranium
resources. These data are widely believed to provide an accurate and solid basis for future
decisions about nuclear energy. Unfortunately, as it is demonstrated in this paper, they do
not.
The conventional worldwide uranium resources are estimated by the authors of the Red
Book as 5.5 million tons. Out of these, 3.3 million tons are assigned to the reasonable assured
category and 2.2 million tons are associated with the not yet discovered but assumed to exist
inferred resources. Our analysis shows that neither the 3.3 million tons of “assured” resources
nor the 2.2 million tons of inferred resources are justified by the Red Book data and that the
actual known exploitable resources are probably much smaller.
Despite many shortcomings of the uranium resource data, some interesting and valuable
information can be extracted from the Red Book. Perhaps most importantly, the Red Book
resource data can be used to test the “economic-geological hypothesis”, which claims
for example that a doubling of uranium price will increase the amount exploitable uranium
resources by an even larger factor. The relations between the uranium resources claimed for
the different resource categories and their associated cost estimates are found to be in clear
contradiction with this hypothesis.
∗e-mail:Michael.Dittmar@cern.ch
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1 Introduction
Policy makers almost never discuss uranium resources and many other important resource issues
in public. One reason seems to be that most energy resources are still considered to be “no-
problem” and thus a taboo topic for worldwide policy makers and their economic or academic
advisors.
However the recent price explosions for oil and related media headlines seem to indicate some
attitude change with respect to the oil resource situation. In fact, more and more people start to
pay attention to questions of geological and technological limits of oil extraction capacities. This
has resulted in the wish to obtain accurate oil and gas resource data, especially from the OPEC
countries[1].
In contrast, the uranium resources appear to be accurately documented in the “Red Book:
Uranium Recources, Production and Demand”. In this book, updated every two years, the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) from the United Nations and the NEA (Nuclear Energy
Agency) from the OECD countries have presented for more than 40 years [2], their collective
knowledge about uranium resources and its use for civilian nuclear energy. The latest update,
the 2007 edition, was published in early June 2008[3]. This book provides more than 400 pages
of detailed information about uranium resources in a large number of countries. A long history
of reporting worldwide uranium resource data with a precision between 1/1000 and 1/10000 is
believed to demonstrate that reliable resource data are presented. The findings of the Red Book
2007 edition were presented for example in the NEA press communique´[4] with (quote):
“There is enough uranium known to exist to fuel the world’s fleet of nuclear reactors at current
consumption rates for at least a century, according to the latest edition of the world reference on
uranium published today. Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand, also known
as the Red Book, estimates the identified amount of conventional uranium resources which can be
mined for less than USD 130/kg* to be about 5.5 million tonnes, up from the 4.7 million tonnes
reported in 2005. Undiscovered resources, i.e. uranium deposits that can be expected to be found
based on the geological characteristics of already discovered resources, have also risen to 10.5 mil-
lion tonnes. This is an increase of 0.5 million tonnes compared to the previous edition of the report.
The increases are due to both new discoveries and re-evaluations of known resources, encouraged
by higher prices.
(*On 26 May 2008, the spot price for uranium was USD 156/kg.)
After reading such a declaration, most people will obviously assume that the uranium supply
situation is safe. Why should one even bother to look into the accumulated uranium data or doubt
these well respected international organizations with their large scientific staff? As a consequence
of this attitude, individuals and organizations with different philosophical views about nuclear
energy almost never question the objectivity and precision of these data[5].
Unfortunately, as will be shown in the following, the Red Book uranium resource data do not
measure up to the pretended standards of accuracy.
In this paper, the Chapter III of “The Future of Nuclear Energy” [6], we analyze the uranium
resource data given in the Red Book 2007[3]. First we present and discuss the overall worldwide
uranium resource data and their evolution in section 2. In order to investigate the basis for these
data, the uranium resource data for the 10 countries with more than 100000 tons of reasonably
assured resources (RAR) are analyzed in section 3. Combined, these 10 countries represent about
80% of the world’s total RAR and 95% of the economically most interesting RAR cost category,
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< 40 dollars/kg. As will be demonstrated in detail, the Red Book 2007 uranium resource data
often show amazing changes with respect to previous Red Book editions, some of these individual
country resource changes appear to be totally unbelievable.
In the final section 4, the long term uranium supply situation and its consequences for the
future of conventional nuclear fission power plants will be summarized.
2 Worldwide uranium resources and their evolution
As highlighted already in chapter I and II of this report, the authors of the Red Book do not
ignore the possibility that “uranium supply shortfalls could develop if production facilities are not
implemented in a timely manner”. However, the world media have essentially only transmitted
the statement that “the identified conventional uranium resources have increased from 4.7 million
tons in the previous report to 5.5 million tons”.
In the following we will analyze this apparent 20% increase in conventional uranium resources in
detail. In order to do this we start with the methodology on how the authors of the Red Book
obtain their data and present the definitions of the different uranium resources categories.
2.1 Red Book methodology, resource categories and extraction costs
The authors of the Red Book describe the content and the methodology to obtain the relevant
data in their own words as (Quote)[7]:
“The Red Book features a comprehensive assessment of current uranium supply and demand and
projections to the year 2030. The basis of this assessment is a comparison of uranium resource
estimates (according to categories of geological certainty and production cost) and mine production
capability with anticipated uranium requirements arising from projections of installed nuclear ca-
pacity. In cases where longer-term projections of installed nuclear capacity were not provided by
national authorities, projected demand figures were developed with input from expert authorities...
The Red Book also includes a compilation and evaluation of previously published data on uncon-
ventional uranium resources...
This publication has been prepared on the basis of data obtained through questionnaires sent by the
NEA to OECD member countries (19 countries responded) and by the IAEA for those states that
are not OECD member countries (21 countries responded and one country report was prepared
by the IAEA Secretariat). The opinions expressed in Parts I and II do not necessarily reflect the
position of the member countries or international organisations concerned. This report is published
on the responsibility of the OECD Secretary-General.”
In Appendix 2 of the Red Book, a list of reporting organizations and contact persons is given
for a large number of countries[8]. This list indicates that uranium resource data are a compilation
of data from the different government agencies, sometimes supplemented by the data from private
transnational mining companies. As large national and private interests are involved, the objec-
tivity and the accuracy of the presented data is certainly not assured. Thus, the resource data
do not represent the results from an accurate scientific analysis of geological data. Unfortunately,
such possible shortcomings of these resource estimates and possible large uncertainties are not
mentioned in the Red Book.
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However, in absence of better data and in line with the required political consent from many
countries, it seems that the editors of the Red Book try to encourage the different countries to
provide useful and comparable resource data. As a result, using the US dollar as a universal
standard, consistent categories for uranium resources are defined.
Unfortunately a few comments, presented in the Appendix 4 [9] seem to indicate that the Red
Book resource data are not as accurate as otherwise stated.
For example it is written that:
• “The categories are defined according to a believed level of confidence”.
But associated probabilities for the believed existence of the resources are not quantified.
• “The resource categories are defined in terms of the uranium recovery costs at the ore pro-
cessing plant.”
But no explanation on how this cost should have been calculated for “non existing ore pro-
cessing plants” in “not yet known environments” is given. We predict that such estimates
will remain a mystery for a long time.
• “It is not intended that the cost categories should follow (undefined) fluctuations in market
conditions” [10]. This can only mean that cost estimates have been done independently from
the mining costs. Not everybody will agree that the increased mining costs of the past few
years, related among other things to the energy costs and in particular to the oil price, are
just simple “market fluctuations”.
In summary, the used methodology leaves some “freedom” on how the correspondents from the
different countries should present their resource data. This “freedom” could explain some large
RAR resource changes found for different countries and from the subsequent Red Book editions.
The uranium resources are separated into “conventional” and “unconventional” resources.
The conventional resources are divided into Reasonably Assured Resources (RAR) and the
believed to exist Inferred Resources (IR). The RAR and IR categories are further subdivided
according to the assumed exploitation cost in US dollars. These cost categories are given as < 40
dollars/kg, < 80 dollars/kg and < 130 dollars/kg.
The unconventional resources are split into “Undiscovered Resources (UR)”, further sepa-
rated into “Undiscovered Prognosticated Resources (UPR)”, with assumed cost ranges of <
80 dollars/kg and < 130 dollars/kg, and the “Undiscovered Speculative Resources (USR)”.
The USR numbers are given for an estimated exploitation cost of
< 130 dollars/kg and also for the category with an unknown cost.
For the purpose of this analysis, the data from the inclusive “< x dollars/kg” categories are
used to calculate the sometimes more informative exclusive resource data with extraction costs
between 40-80 dollars/kg and 80-130 dollars/kg.
A critical reader of the Red Book will express doubts about the data quality, when roughly
known numbers are given with an unbelievable precision of 0.1% or better. In this respect it
seems to be an ironic mistake that the best known numbers in the RAR categories are given
with an accuracy of 1/1000 but the speculative IR and UR categories are presented with an
accuracy of 1/100001. Despite such pseudo-precise data, names like “Undiscovered Resources” and
1At least some progress has been made since the Red Book edition 2005, when the claimed accuracy was presented
with an accuracy of 1 part per million.
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“Undiscovered Speculative Resources”, should not give a high level of confidence in the accuracy
of the associated amount of uranium.
A more accurate methodology would include effects from changes in the uranium mining tech-
nology and its related costs, the quality of the mining equipment, the oil price, salaries and the
often ignored huge costs to repair environmental damages following the past uranium exploration.
In addition, detailed information should be provided on (1) how variations of the dollar exchange
rate have modified the resource data, and (2) how past uranium extractions have been taken into
account.
We leave it to the reader to reflect on the following question:
“Can the existing Red Book methodology result in accurate estimates for the discovered and
undiscovered uranium resources?”
2.2 The economic-geological hypothesis about uranium resources
According to geological estimates one knows that uranium is not a particularly rare metal. Ex-
pressed in the words of the relevant WNA document one reads (quote)[11]:
“Uranium is a relatively common metal, found in rocks and seawater. Economic concentrations
of it are not uncommon.”
Table 1 shows uranium or grade concentrations for different minerals in the earth crust and in
sea water and in parts per million (ppm).
uranium content of: concentration [ppm U] uranium / ton
Very high-grade-ore 20% U (Canada) 200 000 ppm U 200 kg/ton
High-grade-ore 2% U 20 000 ppm U 20 kg/ton
Low -grade-ore 0.1% U 1 000 ppm U 1 kg/ton
Very low -grade-ore∗ (Namibia) 0.01% U 100 ppm U 0.1 kg/ton
Granite 4-5 ppm U 0.004 kg/ton
Sedimentary Rock 2 ppm U 0.002 kg/ton
Earth continental crust (average) 2.8 ppm U 0.003 kg/ton
Sea water 0.003 ppm U 0.000003 kg/ton
Table 1: The numbers are taken from the August 2009 version of the WNA information paper
“Supply of uranium” [11]. The ∗ in the WNA document is associated with very low grade uranium
mining from the Rossing mine in Namibia and the (quote): “If uranium is at low levels in rock or
sands (certainly less than 1000 ppm), it needs to be in a form which is easily separated for those
concentrations to be called “ore” - that is, implying that the uranium can be recovered economically.
This means that it need to be in a mineral form that can easily be dissolved by sulfuric acid or
sodium carbonate leaching.”.
It is generally accepted that the product of the uranium concentration and the total amount
of uranium which exist in this concentration and in the earth’s crust will increase by a large
factor if the concentration decreases. K. S. Deffeyes and I. D. MacGregor have estimated [12]
on rather generally accepted geological methods that this trend must continue until the average
uranium concentration of 2.8 ppm is reached. According to Deffeyes and MacGregor one can expect
approximately that the amount of extractable uranium will increase by a factor of perhaps 300,
if one can exploit each tenfold decrease in ore grade. They added the usually ignored statement
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that quote (words in brackets are added by us):
“no rigorous statistical basis exists for expecting a log-normal distribution and that this is just an
approximate argument as the enormously complex range of geochemical behavior of uranium and
its wide variety of different (chemical?) binds (determine?) the economic deposit.”
It is thus important to keep in mind that resource calculations, based on the above
methods possibly ignore other important factors which limit the amount of eventually
extractable uranium. For example one can imagine that hypothetical super high concentration
kg rocks exist a few hundred meters deep. However, if these rocks are isolated from each other and
from any other interesting mineral concentration, it can be assumed that sizable amounts of these
rocks will essentially never be extracted. Thus, in addition to the average ore concentration, one
finds that the uranium amount in this concentration, its chemical composition and its surrounding
must play an important role for a potential extraction and the corresponding energy cost.
A consequence of this hypothesis is that, no matter what growth scenario is assumed, sufficient
uranium resources exist in theory and if the extraction cost are allowed to increase. It is usually
added that the current uranium price does only have a negligible effect on the production cost of
the kWhe. Arguments that, instead of the monetary prize, the energy return over energy invested
value needs to be taken into account are usually dismissed with the statement that current energy
extraction costs of uranium are small compared to other costs and the very low grade Rossing
mine in Namibia is often given as a proof that one can still go a long way before the extraction
energy cost will become important[13].
However, instead of exchanging endless arguments about the limits of this approach, we propose
to use the Red Book uranium resource data base to test the above hypothesis, called in the
following:
The “economic-geological hypothesis”
This can be done easily as the Red Book quantifies the RAR and IR uranium resources according
to almost equal and increasing cost intervals of about 40 dollar and 50 dollars. According to this
hypothesis much larger uranium quantities are expected for the higher cost categories.
The “economically extractable uranium resources are limited”
hypothesis
An alternative hypothesis assumes basically that uranium and its use in the energy sector
has nothing special in comparison with any other energy resource. Consequently the “law of
diminishing return” applies also to uranium and the exploitation and use of uranium will follow
these lines:
• The usage of uranium will start with the finding and exploitation of the big and high ore
grade uranium deposits.
• Once these big “elephants” are hunted, one will turn to smaller and lower grade uranium
deposits. One tries to keep on going by developing and using better and better technology.
• Eventually the interesting deposits at the mine become too small and too diluted and the
production will be terminated. This moment is reached in a similar way for oil and for
uranium, and according to the argument of M. K. Hubbert [14] when he replied to David
Nissen - Exxon:
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“.. [T]here is a different and more fundamental cost that is independent of the monetary
price. That is the energy cost of exploration and production. So long as oil is used as a
source of energy, when the energy cost of recovering a barrel of oil becomes greater than the
energy content of the oil, production will cease no matter what the monetary price may be.”
While this hypothesis is theoretically very attractive, it can not be used easily to make a
quantitative test. For example the energy extraction costs and the total energy costs are rarely
given in the required detail. Furthermore, it is essentially impossible to quantify the potential
“next round technological improvements”. For example breakthrough new reactor concepts, based
on the fuel breeding concept and including perhaps the use of thorium, and much better, but so
far unknown, uranium extraction techniques can always be imagined. Thus, as is the case with
the peak oil hypothesis, most people will accept this idea only once an exact peak date for the
nuclear energy can be determined. This, of course, can be done only some time after the final
decline becomes obvious.
2.3 Evolution of Uranium Resources according to the Red Book
2.3.1 A consistency check of the NEA Press declaration
We now turn to two claims made in the Red Book 2007 edition (abbreviated in the following
as RB07 where the number indicates the publication year) and transmitted by their own press
declaration to the media (Quote)[4]:
(1) “There is enough uranium known to exist to fuel the world’s fleet of nuclear reactors at current
consumption rates for at least a century, according to the latest edition of the world reference on
uranium published today. Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand, also known
as the Red Book, estimates the identified amount of conventional uranium resources which can be
mined for less than USD 130/kg* to be about 5.5 million tonnes, up from the 4.7 million tonnes
reported in 2005.”
(2) “The currently identified resources are adequate to meet the expansion of nuclear power plants
from 372 GWe in 2007 to between 509 GWe (+38%) and 663 GWe (+80%) by 2030.”
Let us recalculate the numbers presented to the media. The yearly uranium needs to operate the
existing nuclear power plants with the 2009 capacity of 370 GWe are about 65000 tons. As it is
claimed above and quantified in the RB07, the conventional uranium resources of 5.5 million tons
are the sum of the RAR (< 130 dollar/kg), given as 3 338 300 tons, and the believed to exist
IR (< 130 dollar/kg), given as 2 130 600 tons. Following this logic, a simple division tell us that
these 5.5 million tons of uranium resources, at constant usage, are sufficient at best for 85 years
or ”almost a century” and not “for at least a century”!
Furthermore, a more correct press declaration would perhaps say:
“The well known RAR numbers have remained roughly constant during the past years and these
known resources are sufficient to operate the current world’s reactor fleet for about 51 years only.
However, since the amount of believed to exist IR resources has increased by about 700000 tons,
another 34 years can be added if all this IR uranium can indeed be extracted.”
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Next we can ask how long the conventional uranium resources will last under the condition of
a 38% or 80% growth scenario between 2007 and 2030.
Given these growth assumptions, by the year 2030, the yearly natural uranium requirements
would be between 90000 tons/year and 115000 tons/year.
For simplicity one could assume that the above increase would be achieved with an average 23
year growth rate of 1.4%/year and 2.5%/year respectively. Following this growth model during the
23 years from 2007 to 2030 between 1.76 and 2.02 million tons would have been used already by
the year 2030. By the year 2030 the world reactor fleet would need between 90000 tons/year and
115000 tons/year. If one assumes the unlikely case that nuclear energy would remain constant after
2030, the claimed conventional uranium resources from 2007 could thus fuel the 509 GWe power
plants scenario up to the year 2071 and the 663 GWe scenario up to the year 2060. Consequently,
one finds that the operating lifetime of the reactors build during the years 2020 to 2030 will be
limited by the amount of identified fuels and not by the expected 60 year lifetime.
These simple examples show that the claims made in the NEA press declaration are not justified
by their own Red Book data.
2.3.2 A 20% increase of the conventional uranium resources?
As the reported increase of conventional uranium resources between 2005 and 2007 is nevertheless
relatively large, it might be interesting to learn where and in which price category the increase
has happened. Furthermore, one might be curious to see how the reduced dollar value and the
increased mining costs are reflected in the pseudo-precise resource data and if a reduction from
the yearly uranium extraction is included for the different countries.
We first present, Tables 2-5, the world total resource estimates for the different categories and
their evolution as given in the last 4 Red Book editions from 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 [15]. In
order to simplify the discussion, the numbers are recalculated such that the uranium amounts for
a given cost interval can be compared. Table 2 shows the evolution of the conventional resources
since 2001. As one can see, the always highlighted huge increase is essentially only associated with
some changes in the undiscovered but believed to exist IR resources. Furthermore the presented
RAR data do not indicate that the yearly uranium extraction of roughly 40000 tons has been taken
into account. Table 3 and 4 show the corresponding evolutions for the RAR and IR categories
split according to the estimated extraction cost range.
Red Book year RAR [tons] IR [tons] conventional resources [tons]
< 130 dollars/kg < 130 dollars/kg < 130 dollars/kg
2001 2853000 1080000 3933000
2003 3169238 1419450 4588688
2005 3296689 1446164 4742353
2007 3338300 2130600 5468800
Table 2: The evolution of the conventional uranium resources split into the reasonably assured
resource (RAR) and the inferred resource (IR) categories from the latest four Red Book editions.
Especially remarkable is fact that the RAR numbers have increased by only a small amount and
remained essentially stable since 2003. Thus the claimed large increase in conventional uranium
resources since 2001 and especially during the past 4 years is only based on the increased IR
number.
8
Red Book year RAR [tons] RAR [tons] RAR [tons]
< 40 dollars/kg 40-80 dollars/kg 80-130 dollars/kg
2001 1534100 556650 589770
2003 1730495 575197 661941
2005 1947383 695960 653346
2007 1766400 831600 740300
Table 3: The evolution of the reasonably assured resource (RAR) category from the latest four
Red Book editions. Especially remarkable is that the highest uranium numbers are found in the
lowest cost category and this category has, after regular large increases, suddenly decreased since
2005 by about 180000 tons.
The RAR numbers, even though claimed to be known with unbelievable precision, appear to fluctuate
by a large amount. The drop of 180000 tons in the cheapest and best understood < 40 dollars/kg
category between 2005 and 2007 is certainly remarkable and more details about this reduction will be
given in section 3.
Otherwise and on first view, ups and downs of about ± 10% appear perhaps to be reasonable. For
example one might expect that inflation moves some resources from the cheaper to the more expensive
ones. Such an explanation requires also that a certain amount from the highest cost category becomes
out of scale.
Next we turn to the more and more speculative uranium resources. In Table 4 the not yet found but
believed to exist IR uranium data are presented. Especially suspicious is the large increase of 400000 tons
in the < 40 dollars/kg IR category. This increase can be compared with the corresponding RAR numbers
from Table 3, which decreased during the same period by 180000 tons.
The situation becomes even more bizarre when one compares the evolution of the IR category during
the past 6 years from 2001 to 2007. For example the 40 dollars/kg IR category increased by a factor of 2.2
and the 40-80 dollars/kg category by a factor of 3.5. In comparison the amount in the 80-130 dollars/kg
category changed only by a factor of 1.3. Finally one can compare the evolution of the conventional
resources in the RAR category and the more speculative IR category. As mentioned already, large
exploration efforts during the past years have left the total RAR numbers essentially unchanged but have
increased the believed to exist IR figure by a large amount. This means that the claimed increase from
2005 to 2007 in the conventional uranium resources is not based on real discoveries, but on an unexplained
hope factor associated with the IR deposits, eventually to be discovered.
More details about these changes will be discussed in the individual country analysis below.
Red Book year IR [tons] IR [tons] IR [tons]
less than 40 dollars/kg 40-80 dollars/kg 80-130 dollars/kg
2001 552000 186950 225150
2003 792782 275170 320868
2005 798997 362041 285126
2007 1203600 655480 272200
Table 4: The evolution of the not yet discovered but believed to exist IR uranium resources as
given in the last four editions of the Red Book. Remarkable is the claim that the cheaper cost
categories increased by a large amount but the highest cost category has even decreased.
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Table 5 shows the evolution for the undiscovered prognosticated and speculative UPR and USR
resource categories. In contrast to the increase from 2003 to 2007 in the conventional IR resources, only
relatively minor changes are claimed for the even more uncertain UPR and USR resources.
Red Book year UPR [tons] UPR [tons] USR [tons]
less than 80 dollars/kg 80-130 dollars/kg less than 130 dollars/kg
2001 1480000 852000 4438000
2003 1474600 779900 4437300
2005 1700100 818700 4557300
2007 1946200 822800 4797800
Table 5: The evolution of the undiscovered prognosticated UPR and speculative USR uranium
resources according to the past four Red Book editions. In comparison to the large relative changes
in the IR data the numbers presented show an astonishing stability.
One finds from Tables 3-5 that the uranium resources in the RAR, IR and UPR categories decrease
for the higher cost intervals. Furthermore, one observes that the estimated world RAR as well as the IR
and UPR numbers have changed in some very particular and unnatural ways.
Thus, the overall uranium resource data and their evolution are in contradiction with
the “economic-geological hypothesis”, presented in section 2.2.
Furthermore, and if inflation effects are ignored, one would expect that the changes of the uranium
quantities in the different cost RAR, IR and UPR categories for the RAR, the IR and the UPR should
follow similar trends. As the uranium resource data do not confirm such expectations, one is left with
the conclusion that the pretended high quality uranium data do not exist.
3 Evolution of uranium resources in selected countries
In order to understand how and where uranium resources have changed during the past few years, one
needs to study the information provided by the correspondents from a few different countries with large
resources. For this purpose the Red Book editions from the years 2003 (RB03), 2005 (RB05)and 2007
(RB07) will be used. We restrict the discussion to the 10 countries, which claim to have more than 100000
tons of extractable RAR uranium resources for < 130 dollars/kg within their territory. Combined, these
10 countries, cover a surface of about 52 million km2 or more than 1/3 of the total land surface of our
planet. After at least 50 years of non negligible worldwide geological research efforts, these countries
claim to have 80% of the remaining known world uranium resources and up to 95% of the uranium in
the economically most interesting < 40 dollars/kg RAR category and roughly 90% of the total uranium
extraction in 2007 came from these countries.
Table 6 and 7 show the claimed amount of RAR uranium resources for these countries in the < 40
dollars/kg and 40-130 dollars/kg categories.
Some spectacular ups and downs can be observed for the three Red Book editions. For example,
between 2005 and 2007, the RAR reserves in the < 40 dollars/kg category decreased by 15% (minus
40000 tons) for Kazakhstan and by 88% (minus 150000 tons) for Niger. Drastic changes during these
two years are also reported in the 40-130 dollars/kg RAR category for Australia, Kazakhstan, Niger,
Russia and the Ukraine. Despite the fact that the RAR numbers, especially in the less than 40 dollars/kg
category, are assumed to present the most accurate estimate, essentially no explanations for the often
dramatic changes are given.
The changes for the yet unobserved but believed to exist IR resources are sometimes even more
interesting. As presented in section 2, and in contrast to the essentially unchanged claimed total RAR
10
country RAR (RB03) RAR (RB05) RAR (RB07)
40 dollars/kg [tons] 40 dollars/kg [tons] 40 dollars/kg [tons]
Australia 689000 701000 709000
Brazil 26235 139900 139600
Canada 297264 287200 270100
Kazakhstan 280620 278840 235500
Namibia 57262 62186 56000
Niger 89800 172866 21300
Russia 52610 57530 47500
South Africa 119184 88548 114900
Ukraine 15380 28005 27400
USA* 102000 102000 99000
sum 1627000 1714000 1621000
Table 6: Evolution of the low cost RAR uranium category for 10 countries which claim to have
a total of more than 100000 tons of RAR resources on their territory. An especially remarkable
change during the years 2005 to 2007 can be seen for Niger. ∗The USA report do not report a
number for the < 40 dollars/kg RAR category, the amount in the < 80 dollars/kg is used here.
resources, the data reported for the IR category and the < 130 dollars/kg price tag have increased by
almost 700000 tons between the year 2005 and 2007. The sometimes spectacular and unlikely relative
changes for some countries can be seen from Table 8 where we present ratios of the resource numbers
found presented in RB07 and RB05 and for two IR cost categories and for the UPR category. An espe-
cially remarkable increase is observed for Russia. It is claimed that their IR 40-130 dollars/kg category
increased by a factor of 17.7 from 19000 tons to 337000 tons. The reported changes of the IR data for
Australia, Kazakhstan, Niger and the Ukraine are also interesting.
As we have seen already in section 2, the celebrated increase of the conventional uranium resources
does not come from new discoveries of interesting uranium deposits, but from a new evaluation of the
supposed to exist IR resources. This statement can now be made more accurately! The data show that
this claimed increase of the IR resource comes essentially only from Russia (from 40652 tons to 373300
tons), Australia (from 396000 tons to 518000 tons) , Kazakhstan (from 302202 tons to 439200 tons) and
the Ukraine (from 23130 tons to 64500 tons).
A closer look at Russia shows that this increase is very suspicious. While the IR number in the <
40 dollars/kg category changed by only 15000 tons from 21572 tons to 36100 tons, an incredible increase
from 19080 tons to 337200 tons is presented for the 40-130 dollars/kg category.
Kazakhstan is another particular example for drastic changes of the IR data. From the RB05 and
RB07 one finds that the < 40 dollars/kg category IR number for Kazakhstan increased from 129252 tons
in the 2005 estimate to 281800 tons in 2007. The 40-130 dollars/kg number decreased however from
172950 to 157400 tons. In comparison, the very speculative UPR and UPS data for Kazakhstan remain
essentially unchanged.
As discussed in Chapter I and II of this report[6], the evolution of uranium mining in Kazakhstan is
of particular importance to avoid a world uranium supply shortage during the coming 5-10 years. It is
claimed, provided that enough investments in the mining are done, that this country can triple uranium
extraction within the next 10-15 years from 6637 tons in 2007 to 21000 tons in 2015. A very large number
for future uranium discoveries in the low cost category will certainly help to raise foreign interest for
investments in the uranium mining infrastructure.
11
country RAR (RB03) RAR (RB05) RAR (RB07)
40-130 dollars/kg [tons] 40-130 dollars/kg [tons] 40-130 dollars/kg [tons]
Australia 46000 46000 16000
Brazil 59955 17800 17800
Canada 36570 58000 59100
Kazakhstan 249840 235057 142600
Namibia 113270 120370 120000
Niger 12427 7600 222180
Russia 90410 74220 124900
South Africa 196146 167045 169500
Ukraine 49280 38701 107600
USA* 345000 342000 339000
sum 1198900 1106800 1318700
Table 7: Evolution of the higher cost RAR uranium category for 10 countries which claim to
have a total of more than 100000 tons of RAR resources on their territory. Especially remarkable
are the changes from 2005 to 2007 for Australia, Kazakhstan, Niger, Russia and the Ukraine.
These changes in comparison with the ones in the low cost category presented in Table 6 are also
interesting.∗As the USA does not report the < 40 dollars/kg RAR category, the amount in the
80-130 dollars/kg category is used.
Australia and South Africa also claim large increases, but their resources increased only in the 40
dollars/kg IR category. In contrast, the IR data for Canada, Brazil and the USA remained unchanged at
their 2005 values.
The above examples demonstrate that a large amount of the uranium resources and their evolution
are not obtained from geological methods.
3.1 Are some uranium resource data not based on geological methods?
If one accepts that uranium resource data for many countries are not based on geological methods, it
follows that other methods have helped to fill the tables of the Red Book.
Consequently, and in absence of explanations, one is somehow invited to formulate some ideas about
why some particular countries, probably with the help from large mining companies, might be interested
in presenting too high or too low resource numbers.
For example one can imagine that ”sudden” increases in resource numbers, as observed for Australia,
Kazakhstan, Russia and South Africa, will help to attract foreign investment.
On the contrary, a sudden and drastic reduction in the most interesting < 40 dollars/kg RAR cat-
egory, as observed for Niger, could be motivated by ideas (1) that this keeps potential uranium mining
competitors out of the country or (2) that some companies are not interested to inform the government
and the people about their particular richness in mineral resources.
3.2 Relations between the different cost categories
We now compare the individual country resource data with the “economic-geological hypothesis” presented
in section 2.2. Starting with the lowest and highest RAR and IR cost categories of < 40 dollars/kg and 80-
130 dollars/kg, one finds that some country estimates show surprising large differences in these categories
with respect to the world average. For example 53% of the word RAR resources are expected in the <
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country ratio (RB07/RB05) ratio (RB07/RB05) ratio RB07/RB05
IR < 40 dollar/kg [%] IR 40-130 dollar/kg [%] UPR < 130 dollar/kg [%]
Australia 1.42 0.48 NA
Brazil 1 1 1
Canada 0.97 0.83 1
Kazakhstan 2.18 0.91 0.97
Namibia 0.99 0.99 NA
Niger NA 0.4 1
Russia 1.67 17.7 2.65
South Africa 2.19 1.01 1
Ukraine 1.03 3.5 1.47
USA NA NA 1
world total 1.5 1.43 1.1
Table 8: The IR resource ratios as obtained from the Red Book 2007 and 2005 editions and
for the 10 countries which claim to have a total of more than 100000 tons of RAR resources on
their territory. Not all countries have submitted or updated these numbers for the 2007 edition.
Especially remarkable changes are observed for Russia where the category IR (40-130 dollar/kg) is
now estimated to be 337000 tons. Some changes for Australia, Kazakhstan, Niger and the Ukraine
are also interesting.
40 dollars/kg categories but only 22% in the 80-130 dollars/kg category and in disagreement with the
“economic-geological hypothesis”.
The disagreement with this hypothesis becomes even larger for Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan.
For Australia one finds that 98% of the RAR is claimed to be in the low cost category. Too high numbers
for this category are also reported from Canada (82%) and Kazakhstan (62%).
In contrast, the numbers in this cost category from Russia (28%) and for Niger (9%)2 are very low in
comparison.
The data reported for the IR category show similar discrepancies between the world average ratios
and the ones from individual countries. One finds that 56% and 13% of the IR resources are predicted
respectively in the < 40 dollars/kg and in the 80-130 dollars/kg categories. In comparison, the correspon-
dents from Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan think that 94%, 88% and 64% respectively will be found
in the 40 dollars/kg category. The three countries thus predict that their not yet discovered IR resource
fractions match almost perfectly the corresponding RAR fractions.
In contrast, the correspondents from Russia assume that only 9.7% of their IR will eventually be
found in this low cost category. For Niger this IR fraction is given as 42% and thus very close to the
world average.
The Red Book uranium resource data show that the“economic-geological hypothesis” is
not backed up by the data. This conclusion is strengthened beyond doubt if one believes
that Australia and Canada provide the most reliable resource data.
The relation between the RAR numbers and the IR numbers is also interesting. For the< 40 dollars/kg
category, Australia assumes to know about 709000 tons RAR and expects to find another 487000 tons in
the IR category, or 69% of the RAR number. In contrast for Canada the RAR number, given as 270000
tons, the IR number is 82000 tons, thus only 30% of the RAR number.
2For Niger the uranium amount in this class is now given as 21300 tons, which is about 150000 tons smaller than
in the the 2005 edition when 96% of the country’s RAR resources were assigned to the < 40 dollars/kg category.
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3.3 Uranium mining and its effect on resource data?
Finally, we would like to see how uranium extraction, claimed to be known accurately to the ton, e.g. far
better than a 0.1% accuracy, influences the remaining amount of uranium in the different RAR resource
categories and in some selected countries.
For this investigation we remind the reader that worldwide about 40000 tons of uranium are mined
on average per year. For many years, and despite non-negligible efforts by many countries, only three
countries extract about 60% of this uranium and individually more than 5000 tons per year. Another
25% of this uranium comes from three countries which contribute each about 3000 tons/year and further
12% from three additional countries which extract together roughly 5000 tons/year.
Furthermore, the uranium extraction is concentrated within the hands of a few transnational mining
companies. For example the four biggest, Rio Tinto, Cameco, Areva and KazAtomProm provided about
26000 tons/year (about 59% in 2008) to the world uranium market. Despite the claim that plenty of
cheaply extractable uranium can be found almost everywhere on the planet and that the extraction cost
does not play a role, 66% of the 41000 tons extracted in 2007 came from only 10 uranium mines.
The biggest mine today, McArthur River in Canada owned dominantly by Cameco, extracted 7200
tons of uranium in 2007, or about 18% of the worldwide production.
This number might be compared with today’s stressed world oil situation, where the largest oil field
ever, Ghawar in Saudi Arabia contributes about 6% of the total world oil production. In fact it might
be better to compare the fraction of uranium production from this mine alone with the fraction of oil
produced from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined.
The mine started only about 10 years ago and reached 7200 tons/year during the years 2002-2007.
Since the start in the year 2000, about 58000 tons have been extracted. According to Cameco this mine
exploits the world largest high-grade uranium deposit with proven and probable reserves of 332.6 million
pounds of U3O8. Thus an equivalent of more than almost 130000 tons of natural uranium, with about
65000 tons assigned (31.12.2008) as proven reserves[17]. This mine seems to be past peak as in 2008 only
6383 tons were produced and the output from the first half of 2009 reported by Cameco on August 12,
[18], appears to be again some 12% lower than the one obtained during the same period in 2008. If one
assumes that about 50% of the extractable uranium had been extracted up to 2005/06, the presumed
peak year, one could estimate that instead of the 65000 tons only about 45000-50000 tons remain to be
mined. The next few years will tell if the decline observed since 2007 will continue.
The next two mines, Ranger in Australia and Rossing in Namibia, produced together 8000 tons of
uranium in 2008, or only about 25% more than the McArthur River mine. Combined the three largest
mines produced 33% of the total and thus slightly more uranium than the next 7 big uranium mines.
This fraction corresponds roughly to the entire OPEC share of the world oil production.
Thus, uranium extraction is much more centralized and monopolized than any other energy resource.
In fact, if the world oil situation (with a few giant oil companies and a country cartel) frightens policy
makers and most oil consumers, the uranium situation is by all standards much more dangerous.
We now try to see if the amount of uranium extracted during the past years has some effect on
the RAR numbers. For this study we use the uranium quantities extracted during the past few years as
provided from the different editions of the Red Book and repeated in a simple table in a WNA information
paper[16].
Starting with the largest producer country Canada, one finds that the three large existing mines
extracted essentially 100% of the 9477 tons and 9000 tons in 2007 and 2008. During the years 2003-2004
and 2005-2006 the total extracted uranium is given as 22055 tons and 21491 tons respectively. Table 6
shows that the < 40 dollar/kg RAR category decreased during these two year periods by 10064 tons and
17100 tons respectively. As it seems most likely that the existing big uranium mines operate and deplete
only the <40 dollar/kg category the numbers show that only 50% (2005) and 80% (2007) of the decrease
can be accounted for directly. Two explanations are possible, (1) about 12000 tons (2003 + 2004) and
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4000 tons (2005 + 2006) of new deposit in the < 40 dollar/kg RAR category have been discovered during
the considered two year periods or (2) extraction figures are not taken into account.
We now turn to Australia, the second world contributor of uranium. During the four years (2003-2006)
a total uranium extraction of 33663 tons is reported and the < 40 dollar/kg category increased by 20000
tons (Table 6) As Australia does not claim to have significant amounts of uranium in the 40-80 dollar/kg
and 80-130 dollar/kg RAR categories, one finds again that essentially all of the extracted uranium came
from the 40 dollar/kg RAR category.
Consequently the new findings in this category, and between 2003 and 2006, must have been about
54000 tons. However, such large new uranium discoveries over a four year period are somehow puzzling
as the other two RAR cost categories 40-80 dollar/kg and 80-130 dollar/kg remained unchanged between
2003 and 2005 and even decreased by 8000 tons and 22000 tons between 2005 and 2007. Thus, the
extraction numbers from Australia are clearly inconsistent with the reported RAR numbers.
As a last example we analyze the situation in Niger, a former french colony which became independent
in 1960. It is one of the poorest countries in the world with an electricity production of roughly 0.234
billion kWh (2005), corresponding to an almost negligible 18 kWh per year and per person. Yet, the
3032 tons of uranium extracted in 2008 allowed to fuel almost 20 GWe nuclear power plants in France
and Western Europe, which produced roughly 140 billion kWh during that year. Between 2003 and 2006
about 13000 tons of uranium have been extracted from the mines operated dominantly by AREVA, a
french transnational nuclear company.
In 2003, the RAR resources were reported as 89800 tons in the < 40 dollars/kg and 12447 tons in the
40-130 dollars/kg category. These numbers changed by incredible amounts to 172866 tons and 7600 tons
respectively in 2005. Another drastic change is reported in the 2007 Red Book and the corresponding
RAR numbers are now given as 21300 tons and 222180 tons respectively.
Obviously, neither the 13000 tons of uranium extracted during these 4 years are accounted for, nor
does anybody of the Red Book authors seem to be surprised about the incredibly large jumps for the <
40 dollars/kg and 40-130 dollars/kg RAR categories.
These numbers must thus contain some fantasy factor, which can perhaps be explained with the
misinformation hypothesis. This is further supported by AREVA’s problems with the real owners, often
called “Tuareg rebells”, who ask for a larger share in the profits.
In summary, the claimed high precision uranium resource data and the known extraction data from
the past few years do not match. These and the other inconsistencies described in sections 2 and 3 raise
suspicions about the accuracy of the RAR uranium data.
4 Consequences for the long term nuclear energy future.
The analysis, presented in section 2 and 3, demonstrates that the uranium resource data, prepared,
updated and published every two years by the IAEA and the NEA in the Red Book, do not measure up
to the claimed high precision standards. On the contrary, it even seems that some individual country
resource data are not based on a scientific geological resource estimate.
Consequently some large error margins even for the “reasonable assured resources” (RAR) category
should be used. As an example one could assume that the RAR resource numbers from Australia and
Canada are known best and use their own estimate that only the amount in the < 40 dollars/kg category
is relevant for the mining with today’s mining technology. If this idea is applied to the entire world one
would guess that only < 40 dollar/kg RAR category are exploitable. As a result, the known uranium
resources could be guessed as ≤ 2 million tons, corresponding to a static resource lifetime of just 30 years.
Such an evaluation would certainly discourage the idea to construct new standard light water reactors
with a presumed lifetime of 60 years.
This simple-minded example demonstrates that realistic uranium resource information is urgently
needed. Such an analysis, clearly beyond the scope of this paper, would be based on a critical mine by
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mine and country by country analysis.
Despite these shortcomings, the Red Book uranium resource data are the only existing and usable data
base. These data, including large uncertainties, demonstrate that the “economic-geological hypothesis”
is contradicted by the data. This widely used hypothesis states that more and more uranium can be
extracted if only the price is allowed to go up. This claim is in total disagreement with the overall
resource data and with the ones from many individual countries.
Thus, one is left with the choice of either rejecting the Red Book data completely and
sticking with an unproven hypothesis, or giving up that unproven hypothesis.
In summary we point out that countries interested in the construction of a new nuclear power plant
within the next 10-20 years should find a way that their uranium fuel can be guaranteed at least for 40
years before they invest perhaps up to 4 billion Euro per GWe installed power.
The warning applies also to basically all Western European countries, Japan and South-Korea which
depend to almost 100% on stable uranium deliveries from far away. These countries should take one
particular paragraph from the Red Book 2007 NEA press declaration very seriously:
“At the end of 2006, world uranium production (39 603 tonnes) provided about 60% of world reactor
requirements (66 500 tonnes) for the 435 commercial nuclear reactors in operation. The gap between pro-
duction and requirements was made up by secondary sources draw down from government and commercial
inventories (such as the dismantling of over 12 000 nuclear warheads and the re-enrichment of uranium
tails). Most secondary resources are now in decline and the gap will increasingly need to be closed by new
production. Given the long lead time typically required to bring new resources into production, uranium
supply shortfalls could develop if production facilities are not implemented in a timely manner.”
Many other reports have studied the world uranium supply situation in detail. Even though most
of these reports assume, contrary to our study, that the Red Book uranium resource data are roughly
correct, very similar conclusions about the short and long term critical uranium supply situation are
reached. The list below provides references to some recent studies which reach the conclusion that the
known uranium deposits and techniques of uranium extraction are not sufficient to fuel a nuclear energy
renaissance based on conventional light water reactors.
The following three studies are from groups that favor nuclear energy. They find that even a small 1%
annual nuclear power growth scenario will be faced with serious and unsolved uranium supply problem
during the first half of the 21st century.
• The report from the year 2002, “A Technological Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy
Systems” [19] points out that the known conventional uranium resources will only last between
30-50 years. Thus, a new conventional nuclear power plant which might be operational in 2020
might only obtain uranium fuel up to sometime between 2040 and 2050.
• The IAEA 2001 report “Analysis of uranium supply to 2050” [20]. The authors of this report
quantify the uranium deficit with respect to the RAR numbers and for different scenarios about
the future use of nuclear fission energy. The estimated deficit is given in units of million of tons
of uranium. Many details about the potential contributions of uranium from a large number of
unconventional resources are presented in this report (section 5) and especially the remarks about
sea water uranium are remarkable (quote):
“Research on extracting uranium from sea water will undoubtedly continue, but at the current costs
sea water as a potential commercial source of uranium is little more than a curiosity.”
• A 2007 MIT study group concluded that [21] “Lack of fuel may limit U.S. nuclear power expansion”.
Another group of analysts, with critical views about nuclear fission energy, have also studied the Red
Book uranium resource data. All these studies, even if they assume that the Red Book uranium resource
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numbers are more or less accurate, conclude that a substantial increase of nuclear fission energy, using
conventional light water reactors, is essentially impossible.
• The “Energy Watch Group” report from December 2006[22] with Dr. Werner Zittel and Jo¨rg
Schindler from the Ludwig Bo¨lkow Systemtechnik GmbH as the principle authors conclude that
(quote):
“If only 42000 tons/year of the proved reserves below 40 dollar/kg can be converted into production
volumes, then supply problems are likely even before 2020. If all estimated known resources up to
130 dollar/kg extraction cost can be converted into production volumes, a shortage can at best be
delayed until about 2050.”
• WISE Uranium Project[23] “Uranium supply and demand”. Some interesting graphics, relating the
various resource categories from the 2005 Red Book with some modest nuclear growth scenarios,
demonstrate the year when the uranium supply cliff will be reached.
• In the article “The Red Face book” published at Sanders research (September 2008), John Busby
has analyzed the 2007 Red Book in many details [24]. Many of the internal inconsistencies of the
Red Book 2007 have been pointed out in this article and most likely for the first time. His presented
conclusions, about the near and long term uranium supply troubles, are essentially identical to the
ones, obtained independently and with a somewhat different approach in the three chapters of this
report [6].
• Another important report from Nov. 2007, “THE LEAN GUIDE TO NUCLEAR ENERGY”,
by David Fleming [25] has focussed on many issues of nuclear energy and its inconsistencies. D.
Fleming concludes his studies with the statement (quote):
“Shortages of uranium and the lack of realistic alternatives leading to interruptions in supply, can
be expected to start in the middle years of the decade 2010-2019, and to deepen thereafter.”
• Finally we would like to reference the report, “Nuclear power the energy balance”, by Jan Willem
Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith and its latest update by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen [26].
This report tries to give, among other things, an energy balance of the entire nuclear power chain,
starting from the mining to the waste disposal. It presents the hypothesis that ““Economically
extractable uranium resources are limited”.
5 Summary
Despite the shortcomings of the Red Book and the associated large uncertainties, some valuable informa-
tion can still be extracted. Perhaps the most important results of our analysis are:
• The “economic-gelogical hypothesis” that more uranium resources can be extracted if one is only
willing to pay a higher price is in contradiction with the Red Book resource data.
• Realistic uranium resource data can not be obtained directly from the Red Book. However, a
detailed comparison of the data from current and past Red Books and the often far too drastic
resource changes, following some observations from this analysis, can perhaps be used to obtain
eventually a better resource estimate.
• The extractable uranium resources in many countries are most likely much smaller than generally
believed. In absence of a Red Book document that measures up to its claims, perhaps only the
RAR uranium in the < 40 dollars/kg category might be considered as realistic.
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The analysis, presented in this and the previous two chapters[6], demonstrates that the current ura-
nium extraction and the believed-to-exist uranium resources are incompatible even with a modest growth
scenario of conventional nuclear fission power3.
A debate about the future of nuclear energy must therefore be based on the two questions: (1) When –
if ever – will reliable and safe commercial breeder reactors based on uranium or thorium become available?
And (2) Will nuclear fusion power always be 50 years away. The current situation and the prospects about
these future hypothetical options will be presented in the last chapter IV of this report.
It seem that our analysis could be best summarized with an addition to the recent warning from Faith
Birol, the chief economist of the international energy agency[27]: “We should leave oil before it leaves us”,
stating that in fact
“We should also terminate the use of nuclear fission energy in the standard light water
reactors before uranium leaves us as well”.
3Those who disagree with this conclusion are encouraged to present their own uranium resource analysis.
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